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Abstract: This Tends article discusses the issue of the possibility of Bush administration policymakers
lying about the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. (Revision of lead IBPP Trend from July 25th,
V. 14, No. 21
Did policymakers within the Bush administration lie about the threat of Iraqi weapons of mass
destruction (WMD)? And should we be shocked, shocked, if lying did occur? Let’s try and answer these
questions by examining the case for lying.
Lying through disparity. Much has been made of the disparate views on the presence of Iraqi WMD
between intelligence analysts and administration policymakers. Analysts largely took positions that Iraqi
WMD no longer existed or that they existed but did not pose a significant threat or that there were
insufficient data to take a position—itself a position. Policymakers largely took positions that Iraqi WMD
did exist and did pose a significant threat. The disparity has been taken as a smoking gun of
administration lying.
Yet, for disparity to work as a smoking gun, one must accept that analysts have some privileged status to
the truth. Otherwise, the disparity could favor the administration as easily as the analysts. Or the
disparity could suggest that some third party has the correct view or even that no one has access to the
truth or that the truth is unknowable.
So, do analysts have a privileged status to the truth? Maybe not. Analysts, like policymakers, are
subject to the interrelated vagaries of sensation, perception, emotion, motivation, thought, behavior,
and social and biological contexts that construct and set limits on what the truth seems to be and how it
is reached. In fact, history shows us many examples wherein virtually all analysts and/or policymakers
clearly supported some truth, and that truth turned out not to be the truth. Throughout history there
have been culture wars among analysts, policymakers, and the implementers of policy about who has
privileged status to the truth. History’s best answer is that the only truth is that these culture wars have
always gone on and always will.
Lying through righteousness. Much has been made of administration policymakers harboring desires to
invade Iraq years before the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Rationales have included ending the Iraqi threat to
United States (US) security interests, punishing the Iraqi government for its complicity in an
assassination attempt on a former US president, constructing a new Mideast with democracy and free
markets, reinforcing an image and reality of US global and benign superiority, and controlling oil. And
these rationales are based on what we might call righteousness—i.e., they are assumed to be good.
Then, a further assumption is made that—if any or all of these consequences occur pursuant to the
invasion of Iraq—such an occurrence support the hypothesis of policymaker lying.
One problem with this argument is that the cause of lying (the achievement of rationales) is presumed
to have occurred after its effect (lying). This turns the common notion of cause and effect on its head. A
counter to this problem might be that the real cause is not the achievement of rationales but the intent
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to achieve them—with intent occurring before the lying. However, identifying intent—ultimately a
thought or motivational process that one can only surmise in another based on the indirect lens of
behavior—is as tenuous as the assumption that intent leads to events such as lying that logically seems
to follow intent.
Lying through evil. Much has been made by opponents of the President that his administration covets
and engages in the immoral and the unethical. Here, immoral and unethical frequently seem to denote
going it alone in foreign policy, acting only according to business interests, and outright militaristic
pleasure. The administration’s opponents assume that lying is much more likely to occur in the immoral
and unethical, so lying must have occurred.
However, even the most evil can tell the truth. As well, the case of the President and his administration
being evil seems to rely only on not adhering to the political agenda of the opponents. Moreover, the
attribution of evil machinations to authority figures—while occasionally warranted—is most often a
reflection of consciously and unconsciously transferring one’s own undesirable traits to such figures. All
of us who have been managers, supervisors, commanders, leaders, parents, or otherwise a participant in
an unequal power relationship have experienced both sides of this last phenomenon.
Lying through lack of evidence. The President and administration policymakers must have lied about the
presence of Iraqi WMD, because the WMD have not been found subsequent to the invasion of Iraq.
However, some significant amount of WMD may be found. Moreover, policymakers may have sincerely
believed in the presence of WMD and were just plain wrong and were not lying. This belief could be
well founded on the documented development and use of WMD by the Iraqi government in the 1980s
and Iraq’s long-term cover, camouflage, and deception practices.
Lying—should we be shocked? So, the case for lying can be countered. And only deep in the hearts and
mind and souls of the alleged liars does the truth about lying lay. But assuming lying did occur, what
should our reaction be?
Our reaction will depend on the faith we have in what philosophers call moral valuation—the what and
how of our beliefs about right and wrong. To some of us, lying is always wrong. To others, it depends
on the intention behind the lying. To still others it depends on the consequences of lying or some
combination of all the above. To even others—who can be called epistemological relativists—there is
no right and wrong and the very meaning of lying has imploded. To yet others, it depends on how many
other people engage in the behavior—e.g., if we all lie, can or can’t it be wrong?
A conclusion. One might attack the Bush administration for offering up a number of scapegoats—the
Director of Central Intelligence, some National Security Council staffer, or the President himself. One
might attack the Bush administration for taking the assertion of imminent Iraqi WMD threat out of one
speech in 2002 and placing it in another in 2003—from a speech in Cincinnati to the State of the Union
Address. One might attack the Bush administration for outing a covert employee of the Central
Intelligence Agency who is married to a critic of the administration’s stance on Iraqi WMD. One might
attack the Bush administration for waxing in an ironically Clintonian fashion about the technical
correctness of the famous 16 words in the State of the Union Address—all stemming from what the
meaning of is is. Or leaving the realm of Truth for the realm of the Good, one might attack the Bush
administration for losing its way in the war against global terrorism through the smoke and mirrors of
Iraq. Suffice it to say that we are all confronted with choices on the nature of truth. And these choices
2
https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol14/iss22/4

2

Editor: Intelligence, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Truth

International Bulletin of Political Psychology
can be and are used to justify one’s preferred public and private views of the world and to malign those
of others. These choices that we must make—for even choosing not to make a choice is a choice—say
something about how we are human but do not allow us to avoid being human. There’s no way to get
outside these choices to somehow appraise their truthfulness in any ultimately true fashion.
The plain truth of the matter—as I hoist myself on my own truth-petard—is that the only constant of
truth is not its meaning but its function. There may be many truths that are congruent and
contradictory, that talk to each other but also above and below and around and through each other,
that apply to the actor but also the observer, and that seem to last and seem to never even be
transitory. Whole academic fields of inquiry—e.g., historiography, hermeneutics, semiotics, exegesis,
cognitive psychology, and psychodynamic interpretation—are dedicated to these matters. This doesn’t
mean that there is no truth. It does mean that we may be confronted with a more difficult challenge
than knowing what is always true. This latter challenge is knowing what is true and when.
So, in supporting or opposing the Bush administration on questions related to intelligence, WMD, and
truth, we are only supporting or opposing ourselves. We all inevitably play fast and loose with the truth
and with the utmost seriousness whether we know it or not. That’s the truth. (See Beinart, P. (July
28/August 4, 2003). Wrongly accused. The New Republic, p. 6; Corn, D. (July 21/28, 2003). WMD; Who
knew what? The Nation, pp. 6, 8; Kerr, P. (July/August 2003). Bush administration defends intelligence
findings on Iraq. Arms Control Today. http://www.armscontrol.org; Knowlton, B. (July 17, 2003). Bush
and Blair defend decision to wage war in Iraq. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com; Loughlin,
S. (June 4, 2003). Bush administration: Intelligence data on Iraq was not manipulated. CNN.com.
http://us.cnn.com; Moore, J. (June 12, 2003). Democrats talk of WMD intelligence investigation.
RepublicanDailyNews.com. http://www.gopusa.com; Sanger, D.E., & Miller, J. (July 23, 2003). National
security aide says he’s to blame for speech error. The New York Times. p. A11; Stevenson, R.W. (July
19, 2003). White House tells how Bush came to talk of Iraq uranium. The New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com; The Editors. (July 28/August 4, 2003.) 16 words. The New Republic. P. 8.)
(Keywords: Bush Administration, Intelligence, Lying, WMD.)
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